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Abstract The design of artificial empathy is one of the
most essential issues in social robotics. This is because
empathic interactions with ordinary people are needed to
introduce robots into our society. Several attempts have been
made for specific situations. However, such attempts have
provided several limitations; thus, diminishing authenticity.
The present article proposes “affective developmental robot-
ics (hereafter, ADR),” which provides more authentic artifi-
cial empathy based on the concept of cognitive developmen-
tal robotics (hereafter, CDR). First, the evolution and devel-
opment of empathy as revealed in neuroscience and biobe-
havioral studies are reviewed, moving from emotional conta-
gion to envy and schadenfreude. These terms are then recon-
sidered from the ADR/CDR viewpoint, particularly along the
developmental trajectory of self-other cognition. Next, a con-
ceptual model of artificial empathy is proposed based on an
ADR/CDR viewpoint and discussed with respect to several
existing studies. Finally, a general discussion and proposals
for addressing future issues are given.
Keywords Affective developmental robotics ·
Artificial empathy · Self/other cognition
1 Introduction
Empathic interactions among people are important for real-
izing true communication. These interactions are even more
important in the case of social robots, which are expected
to soon emerge throughout society. The importance of
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“affectivity” in human robot interaction (hereafter, HRI)
has been recently addressed in a brief survey from the
viewpoint of affective computing [41]. Several attempts
have been made to address specific contexts (e.g., [26]
for survey) in which a designer specifies how to manifest
empathic behaviors towards humans, and, therefore, under-
stand that capabilities regarding empathic interaction seem
limited and difficult to extend (generalize) to different con-
texts.
Based on views from developmental robotics [4,29],
empathic behaviors are expected to be learned through social
interactions with humans. Asada et al. [6] discussed the
importance of “artificial sympathy” from a viewpoint of CDR
[4]. However, such work has not been adequately precise
from a neuroscience and biobehavioral perspective. There-
fore, the present paper proposes “affective developmental
robotics” (hereafter, ADR) in order to better understand
affective developmental processes through synthetic and con-
structive approaches, especially regarding a more authentic
form of artificial empathy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next
section provides a review of neuroscience and biobehavioral
studies assessing the evolution and development of empa-
thy. This begins with a trajectory from emotional conta-
gion to sympathy and compassion, via emotional and cog-
nitive empathy, and ending with envy and schadenfreude.
Section 3 introduces ADR with a reconsideration of these
terms from an ADR/CDR perspective, particularly along
the developmental trajectory of self-other cognition. Sec-
tion 4 provides a conceptual model of artificial empathy
based on an ADR/CDR perspective. This model is then
discussed in terms of existing studies in Sect. 5. Finally,
current implications and future research directions are dis-
cussed.
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2 Evolution and Development of Empathy
Asada et al. [6] attempted to define “empathy” and “sympa-
thy” to better clarify an approach to designing artificial sym-
pathy. This was done with the expectation of better under-
standing these terms since “empathy” and “sympathy” are
often mistaken for each other. However, their definitions are
not precise and do not seem to be supported by neuroscience
and biobehavioral studies. Thus, we begin our review by
assessing definitions of empathy and sympathy within these
disciplines in order to more clearly understand these terms
from an evolutionary and developmental perspective. This
added precision should provide a more precise foundation
for the creation of artificial empathy.
We adhere to a definition of empathy based on reviews
from neuroscience perspectives that include ontogeny, phy-
logeny, brain mechanisms, context, and psychopathology as
outlined by Gonzalez-Liencres et al. [17]. The relevant points
are as follows:
– The manifold facets of empathy are explored in neuro-
science from simple emotional contagion to higher cog-
nitive perspective-taking.
– A distinct neural network of empathy comprises both phy-
logenetically older limbic structures and neocortical brain
areas.
– Neuropeptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin as well as
opioidergic substances play a role in modulating empathy.
The first two points seem to be related; that is, emotional
contagion is mainly based on phylogenetically older limbic
structures, while higher cognitive perspective-taking is based
on neocortical brain areas. Neuromodulation may amplify
(reduce) levels of empathy both positively and negatively.
A narrow definition of empathy is simply the ability to
form an embodied representation of another’s emotional state
while at the same time being aware of the causal mechanism
that induced that emotional state [17]. This suggests that the
empathizer has interoceptive awareness of his or her own
bodily states and is able to distinguish between the self and
other, which is a key aspect of the following definitions of
empathy-related terms from an evolutionary perspective.
2.1 Emotional Contagion
Emotional contagion is an evolutionary precursor that enables
animals to share their emotional states. However, animals
are unable to understand what aroused an emotional state
in another. An example is an experiment with mice where
one mouse (temporally called “A”) observes another mouse
receiving an electric shock accompanied by a tone. Eventu-
ally, A freezes in response to the tone even though A has
never experienced the shock [8]. Here, A’s freezing behavior
Fig. 1 The Russian doll model of empathy and imitation (adopted from
[11])
is triggered by its emotional reaction and might be interpreted
as a sign of emotional contagion.
In this sense, emotional contagion seems automatic,
unconscious, and fundamental for higher level empathy. De
Waal [11] proposed the evolutionary process of empathy in
parallel with that of imitation (see Fig. 1) starting from emo-
tional contagion and motor mimicry. Both motor mimicry
and emotional contagion are based on a type of matching
referred to as perception-action matching (PAM). Beyond
the precise definitions of other terms, motor mimicry needs
a sort of resonance mechanism from the physical body that
supplies a fundamental structure for emotional contagion.
Actually, people who are more empathic have been shown to
exhibit the chameleon effect1 to a greater extent than those
who are less empathic [7].
2.2 Emotional and Cognitive Empathy
Both emotional and cognitive empathy (hereafter, EE and
CE) occur only in animals with self-awareness such as pri-
mates, elephants, and dolphins. Neural representations for
such complex emotions and self-awareness are localized in
the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula [9]. The
differences between emotional and cognitive empathy are
summarized as follows.
• Emotional empathy (EE):
– an older phylogenetic trait than cognitive empathy
– allows individuals to form representation of others’
feelings by sharing these feelings through embodied
simulation, a process that is triggered by emotional
contagion.
• Cognitive empathy (CE):
1 Unconscious mimicry of behavior from an interacting partner.
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– considerably overlaps in definitional terms with “the-
ory of mind” [39]
– present in apes and humans [12]
– and requires perspective-taking and mentalizing [11].
Compared to emotional contagion that does not require
reasoning about the cause of aroused emotions in others,
both EE and CE require a distinction between one’s own and
others’ mental states and to form a representation of one’s
own embodied emotions. The later styles of EE and CE do not
necessarily require that an observer’s emotional state match
the observed state. Such states can be viewed as sympathy
and compassion, which are explained in the next section.
2.3 Sympathy/Compassion and Envy/Schadenfreude
Sympathy and compassion seem similar to empathy in terms
of emotional states, but different in terms of responses pro-
duced in reference to others’ emotional states. Both require
the ability to form representations of others’ emotions, even
though the emotion is not necessarily shared; however, in
empathy, the emotional states are synchronized [16]. This
implies that sympathy and compassion may require the con-
trol of one’s own emotions in addition to this self-other dis-
crimination.
More powerful control of one’s own emotions can be
observed in envy and schadenfreude, which describe feel-
ings opposite to another’s emotional state and different from
sympathy and compassion. Envy and schadenfreude evolved
in response to selection pressures related to social coherence
among early hunter-gatherers [17].
2.4 The Relationships Among Terms
Figure 2 shows a schematic depiction of the terminology
used in the context of empathy thus far. The horizontal axis
indicates the “conscious level” starting from “unconscious
Fig. 2 Schematic depiction of the terminology (adopted and modified
from Fig. 1 in [17])
(left-most)” to “conscious with self-other distinction (right-
most).” The vertical axis indicates “physical/motor (bottom)”
and “emotional/mental (top)” contrasts. Generally, these axes
show discrete levels such as “conscious/unconscious” or
“physical/mental.” However, terminology in the context of
empathy could be distributed in the zones where it is not
always easy to discriminate these dichotomies. In addition,
there are two points to be mentioned:
– In this space, the location indicates the relative weight
between both dichotomies, and the arrow to the left (the
top) implies that the conscious (mental) level includes the
unconscious (physical) one. In other words, the conscious
(mental) level exists on the unconscious (physical) level
but not vice versa.
– The direction from left (bottom) to right (top) implies the
evolutionary process, and the developmental process, if
“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” Therefore, a whole
story of empathy follows a gentle slope from the bottom-
left to the top-right.
3 Affective Developmental Robotics
Asada et al. have advocated CDR [4,5], supposing that the
development of empathy could be a part of CDR. Actu-
ally, one survey [4] introduced a study of empathic devel-
opment [54] as an example of CDR. For our purposes,
we will rephrase a part of CDR as affective developmental
robotics (hereafter, ADR).2 Therefore, ADR just follows the
approach of CDR, particularly focusing on affective devel-
opment. First, we give a brief overview of ADR following
CDR and then discuss how to approach issues of empathic
development.
3.1 Key Concepts of ADR
Based on assumptions of CDR, ADR can be stated as
follows: affective developmental robotics aims at under-
standing human affective developmental processes by syn-
thetic or constructive approaches. Its core idea is “physical
embodiment,” and more importantly, “social interaction” that
enables information structuring through interactions with the
environment. This includes other agents, and affective devel-
opment is thought to connect both seamlessly.
Roughly speaking, the developmental process consists of
two phases: individual development at an early stage and
social development through an interaction between individ-
uals at a later stage. In the past, the former has been related
mainly to neuroscience (internal mechanism) and the latter
2 ADR starts from a part of CDR but is expected to extend beyond the
current scope of CDR.
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to cognitive science and developmental psychology (behav-
ior observation). Nowadays, both sides approach each other:
the former has gradually instituted imaging studies assess-
ing social interactions and the latter has also included neuro-
scientific approaches. However, there is still a gap between
these approaches owing to differences in the granularity of
targets addressed. ADR aims not simply at filling the gap
between the two but, more challengingly, at building a par-
adigm that provides a new understanding of how we can
design humanoids that are symbiotic and empathic with us.
The summary of this goal is as follows:
A: construction of a computational model of affective devel-
opment
(1) hypothesis generation: proposal of a computational
model or hypothesis based on knowledge from exist-
ing disciplines
(2) computer simulation: the simulation of the process is
difficult to implement with real robots (e.g., consid-
ering physical body growth)
(3) hypothesis verification with real agents (humans, ani-
mals, and robots), then go to (1).
B: offer new means or data to better understand the human
developmental process → mutual feedback with A
(1) measurement of brain activity by imaging methods
(2) verification using human subjects or animals
(3) providing a robot as a reliable reproduction tool in
(psychological) experiments
3.2 Relationship in Development Between Self-Other
Cognition and Empathy
Self-other cognition is one of the most fundamental and
essential issues in ADR/CDR. Particularly, in ADR,
(1) the relationship between understanding others’ minds
and the vicarious sharing of emotions is a basic issue
in human evolution [48],
(2) the development of self-other discrimination promotes
vicariousness, and
(3) the capability of metacognition realizes a kind of vicari-
ousness, that is, an imagination of the self as others (emo-
tion control).
A typical example of (3) can be observed in a situation
where we enjoy sad music [22,23]. The objective (virtual-
ized) self perceives sad music as sad while the subjective
self feels pleasant emotion by listening to this music. This
seems to be a form of emotion control by metacognition of
the self as others. The capability of emotion control could be
gradually acquired along the developmental process of self-
Fig. 3 The developmental process of establishing the concept of the
self and other(s)
other cognition, starting from no discrimination between the
self and non-self, including objects. Therefore, the develop-
ment of self-other cognition accompanies the development of
emotion control, which consequently generates the various
emotional states mentioned in Sect. 2.4.
3.3 Development of Self-Other Cognition
Figure 3 shows the developmental process of establishing the
concept of the self and other(s), partially following Neisser’s
definition of the “self” [37]. The term “synchronization” is
used to explain how this concept develops through interac-
tions with the external world, including other agents. We
suppose three stages of self-development that are actually
seamlessly connected.
The first stage is a period when the most fundamental con-
cept of the self sprouts through the physical interaction with
objects in the environment. At this stage, synchronization
with objects (more generally, environment), through rhyth-
mic motions such as beating, hitting, knocking, and reach-
ing behavior are observed. Tuning and predicting synchro-
nization are the main activities of the agent. If completely
synchronized, the phase is locked (phase difference is zero),
and both the agent and the object are mutually entrained in
a synchronized state. In this phase, we may say the agent
has its own representation called the “ecological self” owing
much to Gibsonian psychology, which claims that infants
can receive information directly from the environment due to
their sensory organs being tuned to certain types of structural
regularities.3 Neural oscillation might be a strong candidate
for this fundamental mechanism that enables such synchro-
nization.
The second stage is a period when self-other discrimina-
tion starts to be supported by the mirror neuron system (here-
after, MNS) infrastructure inside and caregivers’ scaffolding
from the outside. During the early period of this stage, infants
3 Valerie Gray Hardcastle, A Self Divided:A Review of Self and Con-
sciousness: Multiple Perspectives Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole, and
Dale L. Johnson (Eds.).
123
Int J of Soc Robotics (2015) 7:19–33 23
regard caregivers’ actions as their own (“like me” hypothesis
[30]) since a caregiver works as a person who can synchronize
with the agent. The caregiver helps the agent consciously, and
sometimes unconsciously, in various manners such as moth-
erese [24] or motionese [35]. Such synchronization may be
achieved through turn-taking, which includes catching and
throwing a ball, passing an object between the caregiver and
agent or calling each other. Then, infants gradually discrimi-
nate caregivers’ actions as “other” ones (“different from me”
hypothesis [19]). This is partially because caregivers help
infants’ actions first, then gradually promote their own action
control (less help). This is partly explained by the fact that
infants’ not-yet-matured sensory and motor systems make it
difficult to discriminate between the self and others’ actions
at the early period in this stage. During the later period in this
stage, an explicit representation of others occurs in the agent
while no explicit representation of others has occurred in the
first stage, even though the caregiver is interacting with the
agent. The phase difference during turn-taking is supposed
to be 180 degrees. Due to an explicit representation of oth-
ers, the agent may have its own self-representation called
the “interpersonal self.” At the later stage of this phase, the
agent is expected to learn when to inhibit his/her behavior by
detecting the phase difference so that turn-taking between
the caregiver and the self can occur.
During the above processes, emotional contagion (simple
synchronization), emotional and cognitive empathy (more
complicated synchronizations), and further, sympathy and
compassion (inhibition of synchronization) can be observed
and seem to be closely related to self-other cognition.
This learning is extended in two ways. One is recogni-
tion, assignment, and switching of roles such as throwing
and catching, giving and taking, and calling and hearing.
The other is learning to desynchronize from the synchro-
nized state with one person and to start synchronization with
another person due to the sudden leave of the first person
(passive mode) or any attention given to the second person
(active mode). The latter needs active control of synchroniza-
tion (switching), and this active control facilitates the agent
to take a virtual role in make-believe play. At this stage, the
target to synchronize is not limited to the person, but also
objects. However, it is not the same as the first stage with
regard to real objects, but virtualized ones such as a virtual-
ized mobile phone, virtualized food during make-believe play
of eating or giving, and so on. If such behavior is observed,
we can say that the agent has the representation of a “social
self.” More details of the above process are discussed in
[3].
During the above processes, more control of emotion,
especially imagination capability, may lead to more active
sympathy and compassion (inhibition of synchronization),
metacognition of the self as others, and envy and schaden-
freude as socially developed emotions.
Fig. 4 Three mechanisms for the development of the “self”
3.4 Conceptual Architecture for Self-Other Cognitive
Development
According to the developmental process shown in Figs. 3, 4
indicates the mechanisms corresponding to these three
stages. The common structure is a mechanism of “entrain-
ment.” The target with which the agent harmonizes (synchro-
nizes) may change from objects to others, and along these
changes, more substructures are added to the synchroniza-
tion system in order to obtain higher concepts and control of
self/other cognition.
In the first stage, a simple synchronization with objects
is realized, while in the second stage, a caregiver initiates
the synchronization. A representation of the agent (agency)
is gradually established, and a substructure of inhibition is
added for turn-taking. Finally, more synchronization con-
trol skill is added to switch with which the target the agent
is harmonizing. Imaginary actions toward objects could be
realized based on the sophisticated skill of switching. These
substructures are not added but expected to emerge from pre-
vious stages.
4 Toward Artificial Empathy
The above development of self/other cognition could paral-
lel empathic development. Figure 5 indicates this parallelism
of empathic development with ADR/CDR. The leftmost col-
umn shows the correspondence between an ADR/ CDR flow
and the development of empathy by projecting the terminol-
ogy in Fig. 2 onto the Russian doll model in Fig. 1. Here,
the downward arrow indicates the axis of the development
of self-other cognition (therefore, the Russian doll is turned
upside-down to follow the time course). PAM in Fig. 1 is
replaced by “physical embodiment,” which connects motor
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Fig. 5 Parallelism of empathic development with self-other cognition (CDR/ADR)
mimicry and emotional contagion. In other words, motor res-
onance by mimicry induces embodied emotional representa-
tion (i.e., emotional contagion).
The next column in Fig. 5 shows seven points along the
developmental process of self/other cognition, starting from
no discrimination between the self and others with three
stages of self-development in the third column of Fig. 3. The
first four points correspond to emotional contagion: EE and
CE. In cases of sympathy and compassion, one’s emotional
state is not synchronized with that of others’, but different
emotional states are induced. In the case of listening to sad
music [22,23], the listener’s objective (virtualized) self per-
ceives sad music as sad, while the subjective self feels pleas-
ant emotion. Furthermore, the concept of self-other discrim-
ination can be extended to the in-group/out-group concept,
as well as higher order emotional states such as envy and
schadenfreude.
The rightmost column in Fig. 5 shows the list of require-
ments or functions. These are supposed to trigger (promote)
the development of both empathy and self-other discrimina-
tion when designing the above process as an artificial system.
4.1 Motor Mimicry and Emotional Contagion
As mentioned in Sect. 2.1, emotional contagion is auto-
matic (unconscious), and its design issue is how to embed
such a structure into an artificial system. One suggestion
is that motor mimicry induces emotional contagion. Both
mimicry and emotional contagion are based on perception-
action matching (physical embodiment) either to develop
empathy or self-other cognition.
The idea of “physical embodiment” is not new. In fact,
Roger Sperry argued that the perception-action cycle is the
fundamental logic of the nervous system [50]. Perception and
action processes are functionally intertwined; perception is
a means to action and vice versa.
The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor
and parietal cortices of the macaque monkey [14] provides
neurophysiological evidence for a direct matching between
action perception and action production [43]. MNS seems
closely related to motor mimicry since it recognizes an action
performed by another, and produces the same action, which is
referred to as motor resonance that could induce emotional
contagion. Furthermore, this relates to self-other discrimi-
nation, action understanding, joint attention, imitation, and
theory of mind (a detailed discussion is given in [3]).
In humans, motor resonance in the premotor and posterior
parietal cortices occurs when participants observe or produce
goal directed actions [18]. This type of motor resonance sys-
tem seems fairly hardwired or is at least functional very early
in life [49].
4.2 Emotional and Cognitive Empathy
A major part of empathy is both emotional and cognitive,
each of which seems to follow a different pathway of devel-
opment. Therefore, each has different roles and are located
within different brain regions. Shamay-Tsoory et al. [47]
found that patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) display deficits in cognitive empathy and
theory of mind (ToM), while patients with lesions in the infe-
rior frontal gyrus (IFG) show impaired emotional empathy
and emotion recognition. For instance, Brodmann Area 44
(in the frontal cortex, anterior to the premotor cortex) was
found to be crucial for emotional empathy, the same area that
has been previously identified as part of the MNS in humans
[42]. Shamay-Tsoory et al. [47] summarized the differences
between these two separate systems (see Table 1).
Even though they appear as separate systems, emotional
empathy (EE) and cognitive empathy (CE) seem closely
related to each other. Smith [48] proposed seven potential
models for the relationship between the two:
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Table 1 Two separate systems for emotional and cognitive based empa-
thy (adopted from Fig. 6 in [47])
Emotional empathy Cognitive empathy
Simulation system Mentalizing system
Emotional contagion Perspective-taking
Personal distress empathic concern Imagination (of emotional
future outcomes)
Emotion recognition Theory of mind
Core structure Core structure





(1) CE and EE as inseparable aspects of a unitary system.
(2) CE and EE as two separate systems.
(3) The EE system as a potential extension of the CE system.
(4) The CE system as a potential extension of the EE system.
(5) The EE system as a potential extension of the CE system
with feedback.
(6) The CE system as a potential extension of the EE system
with feedback.
(7) CE and EE as two separable, complementary systems.
Models 1 and 2 are two extremes of the relationship
between EE and CE, and Model 7 is between the two. If we
follow Shamay-Tsoory et al. [47], the two seem to be sepa-
rate: phylogenetically and developmentally, CE comes after
EE. However, what is more important than developmental
order is how the two relate to each other because adult humans
have both types and combine them. Smith [48] hypothesized
that Model 7 is generally reasonable.4 Smith also predicted
two empathy imbalance disorders and two general empathy
disorders:
(a) Cognitive empathy deficit disorder (CEDD), consist-
ing of low CE ability, but high EE sensitivity (part of
Autism).
(b) Emotional empathy deficit disorder (EEDD), consist-
ing of low EE sensitivity, but high CE ability (part of
Antisocial Personality Disorder).
(c) General empathy deficit disorder (GEDD), consisting of
low CE ability and low EE sensitivity (part of Schizoid
Personality Disorder).
(d) General empathy surfeit disorder (GESD), consisting of
high CE ability and high EE sensitivity (part of Williams
Syndrome).
4 Interestingly, female empathy tends towards Model 1 while male
empathy towards Model 2 based on behavioral data analysis.
From an ADR/CDR perspective, the following issues
should be discussed:
– EE could be an extension of emotional contagion with
more capabilities in terms of self-awareness and self-
other cognition.
– Main issues in designing CE are perspective-taking and
theory of mind, which are essential in self-other cogni-
tion.
– Smith’s models and hypotheses are suggestive toward
designing a control module of EE sensitivity and CE abil-
ity supposing that self-other cognition is well developed,
and minimum emotion control is acquired.
4.3 Sympathy/Compassion and Envy/Schadenfreude
EE and CE induced emotional and cognitive states are syn-
chronized with others’ states. How can we differentiate our
emotional and cognitive states from those of others? A slight
difference may occur in cases of sympathy and compas-
sion. In these cases, we understand another person’s dis-
tress, but we do not experience the same emotional state
(de-synchronized); instead, we switch our emotional state in
order to sympathize, owing to our emotion regulation abili-
ties.
Larger differences may occur differently in these two
cases. The first is related to metacognition by which one can
observe him/herself from another’s perspective. Therefore,
the individual self is separated into two states: the observing
and observed self. The former may correspond to the subjec-
tive (real) self and the latter the objective (virtualized) self. A
typical phenomenon in this case can be seen when enjoying
sad music. Sad music is perceived as sad by the objective
self, while listening to this music itself is felt as pleasant by
the subjective self [22,23].
Envy and schadenfreude is the second case where per-
ceived emotion synchronized with another’s emotional state
is induced first. Afterwards, a different (opposite) felt emo-
tion is evoked depending on the social context determined
by in-group/out-group cognition.
The above developmental process toward envy and
schadenfreude may suggest the increasing (developing)
capability of regulating an emotion (synchronize/de-
synchronize with others) that is modulated to the extent that
self-other cognition and separation are achieved.
5 ADR/CDR Approaches
There are several design issues related to artificial empathy.
Figure 6 shows a conceptual overview of the development of
artificial empathy by ADR/CDR approaches following the
above arguments. The numbers correspond to the second col-
umn of Fig. 5.
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Fig. 6 An overview of the development of artificial empathy
A flow from the left to right indicates the direction of evo-
lution and development in terms of self-other cognition and
emotion regulation. In order to explicitly indicate a hierar-
chical structure of empathic development, the Russian doll
model shown in Fig. 1, and the leftmost column in Fig. 5,
is illustrated in the background. Small circles with curved
arrows indicate internal emotional states of the agent starting
from no self-other discrimination (1) to completely separated
agent representations with different emotional states (7). The
orientations of the curved arrows indicate emotional states,
and they are synchronized between the self and other (e.g.,
until EE and CE) (4). The underlying structure needed in
emotional contagion, EE and CE is a mechanism of synchro-
nization with the environment, including other individuals
with which to harmonize, is shown at the left-bottom of Fig.
6. However, afterwards they can be de-synchronized (differ-
ent emotions) by emotion regulation capabilities.
Sympathy and compassion are examples of emotional
states differentiating between the self and others (5). Intu-
itively, sympathy appears more EE-dominant while compas-
sion is more CE-dominant. This is because sympathetic con-
cerns seem more emotional, while compassion can be real-
ized after logically understanding others’ states. However,
this difference is actually modest since both sympathy and
compassion require perception of others’ internal states as
well as understanding the relevant cause(s). In addition to
the fundamental structure of synchronization, inhibition of
harmonization with perceived emotion based on the estab-
lishment of agency (self-other discrimination) is needed, as
shown in the middle bottom of Fig. 6.
The above discrepancy in empathy between the self and
others (de-synchronization) is extended in two ways: inter-
nally and externally. The internal extension is as follows:
the self-emotion space is divided into two (6); one is sub-
jective (top) and the other is objective (virtualized: bottom).
This can be a projection of another person’s emotional state.
Perception of an emotional state from the objective self (per-
ceived emotion) seems more CE-dominant since it appears to
involve an objective decision, while the feeling itself seems
more subjective (felt emotion). The external extension is as
follows: both the self and others have their own populations
(7); and inside the same group, all members are synchro-
nized. However, they are de-synchronized with members of
another group. If two groups are competitive (evolutionarily
due to natural selection), hostile emotions to the opponent
group may emerge. A group can be regarded as an extended
self (or other). In both cases, the capabilities of imagination
in the virtualized self (6), and more control over self emotions
(7) are needed to facilitate these various emotional states as
shown in the top-right of Fig. 6.
Hereafter, we review previous studies, some of which were
not categorized as ADR but seem related to the topics dis-
cussed here.
5.1 Pioneering Studies for Artificial Emotion
There are two pioneering studies related to artificial emotion.
The first one is by Prof. Shigeki Sugano’s group.5 The authors
5 For more detail, visit http://www.sugano.mech.waseda.ac.jp.
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built an emotional communication robot, WAMOEBA
(Waseda-Ameba, Waseda Artificial Mind On Emotion BAse),
to study a robot emotional model, particularly focusing on
emotional expression during human-robot interactions [38].
Emotional expression is connected to self-preservation based
on self-observing systems and defined hormone parameters.
The second is a series of studies assessing the emo-
tion expressing humanoid robot WE (Waseda Eye). The
recent WE-4RII displays very rich facial and gestural expres-
sions based on sophisticated mechatronics and software (e.g.,
[31,32]6). The creators designed mental dynamics caused by
stimuli from the internal and external environment based on
an instinctual mental model.
Both sets of studies are pioneering in terms of emotion
being linked to self-preservation or instinct, with robots being
capable of displaying emotional expressions based on these
emotion models. However, it is not clear how a robot can
share an emotional state with humans. Since almost all of
robot behaviors are explicitly specified by the designer, little
space is left for robots to learn or develop the capacity to
share their emotional states with humans.
5.2 Emotional Contagion, MNS, and EE
Designing a computational model that can explain the devel-
opmental process shown in Fig. 6 is very challenging, and
such a model does not yet exist. In the following, we review
examples of existing studies from ADR/CDR perspectives.
Emotional contagion and motor mimicry are related to
each other via PAM (physical embodiment), and motor res-
onance seems to have a key role in connecting the two. Mori
and Kuniyoshi [34] proposed one of the most fundamen-
tal structures for behavior generation based on interactions
among many and different components. These are 198 neural
oscillators, a muscleskelton system with 198 muscles, and
the environment. There are two combinations with the envi-
ronment, one can be the endometrium in the case of fetal
simulations, and the other is the horizontal plane under the
force of the Earth’s gravity in the case of neonatal simu-
lation. Oscillatory movements of the fetus or the neonate
happen in these external worlds, and self-organization of
ordered movements is expected through these interactions.
This leads to interactions with other agents through mul-
tiple modalities such as vision or audition (motor reso-
nance).
Mimicry is one such interaction that may induce emotional
contagion, which links to emotional empathy. In this process,
a part of the mirror neuron system (MNS) could be included
[47]. Mirror neurons in monkeys only respond to goal ori-
ented actions (actions of transitive verbs) with a visible target,
6 Also visit http://www.takanishi.mech.waseda.ac.jp/top/research/
index.htm.
while in the case of humans the MNS seems to also respond
to actions of intransitive verbs without any target ([43]). This
is still a controversial issue that needs more investigation [1].
One plausible interpretation is as follows. In the case of mon-
keys, due to higher pressure to survive, goal oriented behavior
needs to be established and used early. In contrast, humans
owe much to caregivers, such that pressure is reduced; there-
fore, the MNS works not only for goal oriented behavior but
also for behavior without goals. Consequently, much room
for learning and structuring for generalization is left, and this
leads to more social behavior acquisition and extensions to
higher cognitive capabilities.
Nagai et al. proposed a computational model for early
MNS development, which originates from immature vision
[36]. The model gradually increases the spatiotemporal res-
olution of a robot’s vision while the robot learns senso-
rimotor mapping through primal interactions with others.
In the early stage of development, the robot interprets all
observed actions as equivalent because of lower visual reso-
lution and, thus, associates the non-differentiated observation
with motor commands. As vision develops, the robot starts
discriminating actions generated by itself from those by oth-
ers. The initially acquired association is, however, maintained
via development, which results in two types of associations:
one is between motor commands and self-observation and the
other between motor commands and other-observation. Their
experiments demonstrate that the model achieves early devel-
opment of the self-other cognitive system, which enables a
robot to imitate others’ actions. Figure 7 shows a model for
the emergence of the self-other cognitive system originating
from immature vision. Actually, this is not empathic devel-
opment but behavioral (imitation) development. However,
considering the strong link between empathy and imitation,
this model can be regarded as the process from 1 to a point
between 2 and 3 in Fig. 6.
Different from non-human primates, a human’s MNS can
work for non-purposeful actions such as play. Kuri- yama et
al. [25] revealed a method for interaction rule learning based
on contingency and intrinsic motivation for play. The learner
obtains new interaction rules via contact with a caregiver.
Such non-purposive mother-infant interactions could play a
crucial role in acquiring MNS-like functions and also early
imitation capabilities, including mimicry. The chameleon
effect could be partially explained by consequences of this
learning.
The above studies have not been directly related to emo-
tional states such as pleasure (unpleasant) or arousal (sleep),
which are regarded as the most fundamental emotional axes
[44]. Assuming that human infants are born with this fun-
damental form of emotion, how can they have variations in
emotional states such as happiness and anger?
In developmental psychology, intuitive parenting is
regarded as maternal scaffolding based on which children
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Fig. 7 A model for emergence of the self-other cognitive system originated in immature vision
Fig. 8 Learning model for developing sympathy in children through intuitive parenting (left) and associating visual facial expressions of others
with internal states (right)
develop empathy when caregivers mimic or exaggerate the
child’s emotional facial expressions [15]. Watanabe et al. [54]
modeled human intuitive parenting using a robot that asso-
ciates a caregiver’s mimicked or exaggerated facial expres-
sions with the robot’s internal state to learn an empathic
response. The internal state space and facial expressions
are defined using psychological studies and change dynami-
cally in response to external stimuli. After learning, the robot
responds to the caregiver’s internal state by observing human
facial expressions. The robot then facially expresses its own
internal state if synchronization evokes a response to the care-
giver’s internal state.
Figure 8 (left) shows a learning model for a child devel-
oping a sense of empathy through the intuitive parenting of
its caregiver. When a child undergoes an emotional expe-
rience and expresses his/her feelings by changing his/her
facial expression, the caregiver empathizes with the child
and shows a concomitantly exaggerated facial expression.
The child then discovers the relationship between the emo-
tion experienced and the caregiver’s facial expression, learn-
ing to mutually associate the emotion and facial expression.
The emotion space in this figure is constructed based on the
model proposed by Russell [44]. This differentiation process
is regarded as developing from emotional contagion to emo-
tional empathy.
Considering the neural substrates related to empathy
reported in past studies (e.g., [13,27,47]), a draft of the neu-
roanatomical structure for the above computational model is
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Fig. 9 A neuroanatomical structure for the computational model in
[54]
devised in Fig. 9. The consistency of neural substrates in past
studies is not guaranteed since the authors conducted their
experiments under different task paradigms and measures.
Rather, this structure is intended to give an approximate net-
work structure. During learning, the caregivers’ facial expres-
sions, which the learner happens to encounter during an inter-
action, are supposed to be processed in the inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) and/or insula and then mapped onto the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). The dACC is supposed to
maintain the learner’s emotional space that drives facial mus-
cles to express one’s own emotional states. After learning, the
corresponding facial expression is immediately driven by the
caregiver’s facial expression.
Emotional empathy in Fig. 6 is indicated by two circles.
We suppose that the top circle corresponds to the learner’s
own internal state (amygdala) and the bottom to a reflec-
tion (dACC) of the caregiver’s emotional state inferred from
his/her facial expression. In this case, both are synchro-
nized; but after the development of envy and schadenfreude,
more emotional control could switch this reflection to de-
synchronized emotion of others (sympathy and compassion)
or the virtualized (objective) self (metacognition). Partial
support is obtained by Takahashi et al. [51] who found a
correlation between envy and dACC activation in an fMRI
study.
5.3 Perspective-Taking, Theory of Mind, and Emotion
Control
In addition to the MNS, cognitive empathy requires
“perspective-taking and mentalizing” [11], both of which
share functions with “theory of mind” [39]. This is another
difficult issue for not only empathic development but, more
generally, human development.
Early development of perspective-taking can be observed
in 24-month old children as visual perspective-taking [33].
Children are at Level 1 when they understand that the con-
tent of what they see may differ from what another sees in the
same situation. They are at Level 2 when they understand that
they and another person may see the same thing simultane-
ously from different perspectives. Moll and Tomasello found
that 24-month old children are at Level 1 while 18-month-
olds are not. This implies that there could be a developmental
process between these ages [33].
A conventional engineering solution is the 3-D geometric
reconstruction of the self, others, and object locations first.
From there, the transformation between egocentric and allo-
centric coordinate systems proceeds. This calibration process
needs a precise knowledge of parameters, such as focal
length, visual angle, and link parameters, based on which
object (others) location and size are estimated. However, it
does not seem realistic to estimate these parameters precisely
between the ages of 18 and 24 months.
More realistic solutions could be two related ones among
which the second one might include the first one. Both share
the knowledge what the goal is.
The first one is the accumulation of goal sharing expe-
riences with a caregiver. Imagine a situation of a reaching
behavior to get an object. An infant has experience being
successful with this movement, but sometimes fails to reach
a distant object. In this case, a caregiver may help the infant
from the infant’s backside, on his/her side, and in a face-to-
face situation. The infant collects these experiences, includ-
ing views of its own behavior and the caregiver’s. Based on
knowledge regarding the same goal, these views are catego-
rized as the same goal behavior just from different views (dif-
ferent perspectives). Circumstantial evidence for view-based
recognition can be seen in face cells in the inferior temporal
cortex of a monkey brain (Chap. 26 in [40]), which is selec-
tively activated according to facial orientation. Appearance-
based vision could be an engineering method for object
recognition and spatial perception.7 Yoshikawa et al. [55]
propose a method of incremental recovery of the demon-
strator’s view using a modular neural network. Here, the
learner can organize spatial perception for view-based imita-
tion learning with the demonstrator in different positions and
orientations. Recent progress in big data processing provides
better solutions to this issue.
The second is an approach that equalizes different views
based on a value that can be estimated by reinforcement learn-
ing. That is, different views have the same value according to
the distance to the shared goal by the self and others. Suppose
that the observer has already acquired the utilities (state val-
ues in a reinforcement learning scheme). Takahashi et al. [52]
show that the observer can understand/recognize behaviors
shown by a demonstrator based not on a precise object tra-
7 Visit http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/~elgammal/classes/cs534/lectures/
appearance-based%20vision.pdf as a general reference.
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Fig. 10 Affetto: facial expressions, internal structure of the upper torso, and recent pictures
jectory in allocentric/egocentric coordinate space but rather
on an estimated utility transition during the observed behav-
ior. Furthermore, it is shown that the loop of the behavior
acquisition and recognition of observed behavior accelerates
learning and improves recognition performance. The state
value updates can be accelerated by observation without real
trial and error, while the learned values enrich the recognition
system since they are based on the estimation of state value
of the observed behavior. The learning consequence resem-
bles MNS function in the monkey brain (i.e., regarding the
different actions (self and other) as the same goal-oriented
action).
5.4 Emotion Control, Metacognition, and
Envy/Schadenfreude
Emotion control triggers the development from 3 to 4 in Fig.
6: one understands another’s emotional state (synchronize)
first and then shifts their own emotional state to be similar but
different (de-synchronize). In the figure, sympathy appears
EE dominant while compassion is CE dominant, but both
include cognitive processes (understanding another’s state).
Therefore, different forms of dominance do not seem as sig-
nificant as shown in the figure.
Generally, two components of metacognition are consid-
ered: knowledge about cognition and regulation of cogni-
tion [46]. Among four instructional strategies for promoting
the construction and acquisition of metacognitive awareness,
regulatory skills (self-monitoring) seem related to emotional
state 5 in Fig. 6 where a de-synchronized other’s emotional
state (the bottom of 5) is internalized as a target (the bottom
of 5) to be controlled inside one’s own emotional state. This
target represents the self as others (objective or virtualized
self), while the subjective self (the top of 6) monitors this
objective self. In the case of sad music [22,23], a cognitive
process perceives sad music as sad, which, therefore, seems
objective. During this process, simply switching between the
self (subjective) and others (objective) in 4 does not emerge;
rather, more control power comes from the cortex. The medial
frontal cortex (MFC) is supposed to be the neural substrate
for social cognition. The anterior rostral region of the MFC
(arMFC) maintains roughly three different categories: self-
knowledge, person knowledge, and mentalizing [2]. There-
fore, a projection from arMFC to the regions in Fig. 9 seem to
be needed in order to enable more emotion control for envy
and schadenfreude.
5.5 Expressions
Facial and gestural expressions are a very important and
indispensable part of artificial empathy. Classical work from
WE-4RII shows very rich facial and gestural expressions,
and observers evoke the corresponding emotions (same or
different) [31,32]. Although their design concept and tech-
nology were excellent, the realism of interactions depends
on the skill of the designer.
We need more realistic research platforms (in two ways)
as explained by the ADR approach. One is the design of real-
istic robots with the computational model of affective devel-
opment. The other includes platforms for emotional inter-
action studies between an infant and his/her caregiver. For
these purposes, Affetto has the realistic appearance of a 1-
to 2-year-old child, [20,21]. Figure 10 shows an example of
“Affetto.”
6 Discussion
We have discussed the development of empathy along with
that of self-other cognition from a constructive approach
(ADR/CDR) perspective. Here, we expect that the ADR/CDR
can fill the gap between neuroscience and developmental psy-
chology. However, this approach needs to be developed fur-
ther. Here are further points for discussion.
We reviewed empathy terminology, and a conceptual
model of empathic development has been proposed in terms
of self-other discrimination (Fig. 6). The neural architecture
of empathic development [54] has been proposed based on
existing research showing a lack of consistency due to dif-
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ferences in task designs, contexts, and measuring equipment
(Fig. 9). Rather than detailed neural substrates, which might
be different depending on the context and the target emo-
tion, we might hypothesize that a whole functional struc-
ture comprises a network through which cortical and sub-
cortical areas work together. Since subcortical areas develop
earlier than cortical areas, the former are probably at work
first, then the second set come online in situations where one
may encounter an event. From this perspective, further imag-
ing studies assessing children and behavioral robotic studies,
especially focusing on interactions using constructive meth-
ods, are needed to reveal the underlying developmental struc-
ture.
A variety of hormones and neurochemical compounds
participate in the formation and modulation of empathy.
Among them, oxytocin (OT) and dopamine (DA) are the most
common. Besides detailed explanations, it seems possible
that OT and opioid modulate emotional aspects of empathy,
whereas DA modulates cognitive aspects of empathy [17].
We might utilize the functional aspects of these modulators
to enhance (reduce) EE sensitivity and CE ability in order to
characterize empathic disorders [48] with our computational
model.
Theory of mind (ToM) and MN activations have been
investigated in several imaging studies with different
approaches, including written stories and comic strips. This is
an important discrepancy as the involvement and/or require-
ment of language in ToM is debatable. This is because
Broca’s area in humans is supposed to be homologous to
a similar brain region in monkeys, close to F5, where mirror
neurons are found. Studies assessing severe aphasic patients
(e.g., [53]) have reported normal ToM processing. This heav-
ily implies that language capacity is not an essential require-
ment for ToM [1] and probably not for empathy, as well.
Therefore, in the conceptual model in Fig. 6, language fac-
ulties are not included.
In the computational or robot model mentioned thus far,
we have not considered emotional states coming from vis-
ceral organs. Damasio and Carvalho [10] state that a lack of
homeostasis in the body will trigger adaptive behavior via
brain networks, such as attention to a stranger’s next move.
This implies that a homeostasis-like structure is needed to
design embodied emotional representations. One of the pio-
neering WAMOEBA studies [38] proposed a robot emo-
tional model that expresses emotional states connected to
self-preservation based on self-observing systems and hor-
mone parameters. This system was adaptive toward external
stimuli in order to keep bodily feelings stable. Therefore, the
best action is sleeping in order to minimize energy consump-
tion unless external stimuli arise. However, animal behav-
ior, especially among humans, is generated not only by this
fundamental structure need to survive but more actively by
so-called intrinsic motivation [45].
In the machine learning and developmental robotics com-
munity, intrinsic motivation has been obtaining increased
attention as a driving structure of various behaviors [28].
Interest seems to be in how to formalize intrinsic motiva-
tion from a viewpoint of information theory supposing its
existence, not caring as to how it develops. The relationship
between empathy and intrinsic motivation has yet to been
intensively investigated. We might consider a certain struc-
ture of intrinsic motivation as a means to develop artificial
empathy. Explicit or implicit? That’s an issue to be addressed
further.
7 Conclusion
In terms of artificial empathy, we have argued how it can
follow a developmental pathway similar to natural empa-
thy. After reviewing terminology in the context of empathic
development, a conceptual constructive model for artificial
empathy has been proposed. Following are some concluding
remarks.
(1) The development of empathy and imitation might be par-
allel. Emotional contagion, an early style of empathy
linked to motor mimicry, is shared with other animals.
Emotional contagion extends to emotional empathy, sym-
pathy (compassion), and higher emotions owing mainly
to subcortical brain regions (along a developmental time
course; a dependency on subcortical areas diminishes).
(2) While under the control of cortical areas, cognitive empa-
thy develops into compassion (sympathy) (along a devel-
opmental time course; control projections from cortical
areas increases).
(3) ADR has also been proposed, and a conceptual construc-
tive model of empathic development has been devised in
parallel with self-other cognitive development. Here, the
concept of the self emerges, develops, and divides (emo-
tion control seems to manipulate these components).
(4) Several existing studies regarding ADR/CDR are dis-
cussed in the context of empathy and self-other cognitive
development, and possible extensions are discussed.
(5) The proposed constructive model is expected to shed new
insight on our understanding of empathic development,
which can be directly reflected in the design of artificial
empathy.
(6) Still, there are several issues in need of attention, and
more investigations, including imaging studies with chil-
dren and behavioral studies with robots, are needed.
(7) One key issue concerns the emergence of intrinsic moti-
vation through various behaviors. Intrinsic motivation’s
relationship with empathy during the developmental
process is an interesting topic for future research.
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